Your Arlington, your views

Rep. Will Brownsberger, Democrat of Belmont and Arlington, explains why he voted to oppose the National Popular Vote (NPV). His comments are published with his permission.

I write to explain my recent vote today [July 9] against the proposal for an NPV.

I voted in the losing minority in a lopsided 116 to 37 vote. The NPV had the support of Common Cause, the Speaker, many other leading Democrats and all of the constituents who wrote to me about the issue. In fact, at one point, it had my support: I signed on as a co-sponsor to the proposal.

I developed doubts after hearing the first day of debate about it last week. During a one week postponement of the vote, I consulted experts in favor of the proposal. My consultations clarified the issues, but did not relieve my doubts.

In the end, I concluded that, whatever its merits in principle, the proposal creates unacceptable down-side risks for our country, risks that are not outweighed by its alleged benefits.

What is the NPV proposal? The proposal would change the way we select the President of the United States — a technical issue, but one of great importance.

In November, we will each cast a vote for president of the United States. The votes will be counted in each state. In each state, a winner will be identified and the state will send electors to the electoral college to vote for that winner. In order to be elected president, a candidate must achieve a majority of votes in the electoral college (270 of 538).

Each state gets a number of electors equal to the number of senators that it has (two) plus the number of representatives in Congress (proportional to population). In effect, this formula places the small-state to large-state balance of power in choosing a President mathematically mid-way between the balance in the House and the balance in the Senate.

The requirement of winning with an absolute majority in the electoral college forces presidential candidates to assure themselves a geographically broad victory.

If no candidate achieves an absolute majority, the election is decided in the House of Representatives in a special vote in which each state delegation gets one vote. This one-vote rule further advantages smaller states. An absolute majority must be achieved. Only the top three vote getters in the Electoral College may be considered.

Under the NPV proposal, states would enter an interstate compact to the effect that they would instruct their electors in the electoral college to vote for whomever gets the most popular votes nationwide. This does not require a constitutional amendment because the constitution does not control how the states choose electors.

If states controlling a majority of the electors in the electoral college enter the compact, then the compact would take effect. The members of the compact would in the next election instruct their electors to vote for the candidate who won the national popular vote, regardless of whether that candidate won a majority among those states. Since the members are a majority of the electoral college votes, the national popular vote winner would receive the constitutionally required majority in the electoral college.

By its terms, states could withdraw from the compact at any time except during the six months preceding the inauguration date for the president — between July 20 and January 20 every four years.

The NPV increases two kinds of serious risk.

I am frightened by the possibility of a deviant regional candidate – a George Wallace – under the NPV. The NPV lacks the requirement of geographic distribution that the electoral college enforces. In a three way race, a George Wallace, could, for example, win 35% of the vote by winning huge majorities in one region. If the major party candidates split the balance of the vote in other regions, the George Wallace would win. Whereas in the electoral college system, the George Wallace would win only the electoral votes from that region and lack sufficient votes to become president.

The NPV lacks even a runoff mechanism, a requirement that if no candidate wins an absolute majority the top two candidates compete in a runoff election. Few major democracies that elect a President nationally do so without a runoff mechanism. But a runoff is not part of the NPV compact. The compact is designed to be implemented without the necessity of a constitutional amendment and a creating runoff election would require a constitutional amendment.

Which brings me to my second concern: An interstate compact just is not a robust way to build a system as important as the presidential election system. If a state didn’t like the way the NPV system seemed to be headed, they could withdraw even in June of the election year. That’s awfully late in our long cycle and could throw the whole race into confusion. Moreover, if a state decided to withdraw even closer to the election or after the election, the election would end up in the courts. It is not a settled question how and whether the Supreme Court would enforce an interstate compact of this nature, although interstate compacts have been enforced for more mundane issues.

Once I understood these risks, I reexamined the arguments in favor of the NPV. There are three common arguments made in favor of the National Popular Vote.

First, some are offended by the possibility that a candidate who did not actually obtain a majority of the national popular vote could win the presidency in the Electoral College. George Bush did this in 2000 and John Kerry, if he had won Ohio, would have done it in 2004.

In closely divided elections this is a possibility in our system for two reasons: It could sometimes happen that by winning smaller states who carry a slightly disproportionate number of delegates a candidate could gain an advantage in the electoral college. More importantly, lop-side majorities in some states swell the national popular vote of a candidate, but a razor thin margin is enough to win all of a state’s delegates. So, a candidate who won many states by razor thin margins but lost a few states very big could win a majority in the electoral college while losing the popular vote.

These possibilities follow from our identity as a union of states. It is the states that elect the president. Generally, this basic idea checks the power of the federal government and helps to protect local liberty and freedom to experiment. A president who claimed to be elected by the people, as opposed to the states, might be more likely (even than our current overreaching President) to expand presidential power.

Second, because many states are predictable in how they vote, candidates pay much of their attention to “swing states.” Some have gone so far as to suggest that this is the cause for apathy and low voter turnout across the country. However, if low turnout were caused by the electoral college system, then in true blue Massachusetts, the presidential election would be a relatively low turnout election. But the opposite is true, people turnout in droves to cast their vote for the presidency even if the outcome in Massachusetts is a foregone conclusion – it is the local elections that have the lowest turnout.

Third, some suggest that the electoral college system creates incentives for fraud and abuse in the swing states – alleged cases in point, Florida in 2000, Ohio in 2004. This is true, but arguably, in a national popular vote, we could see fraud (or allegations of fraud) anywhere. Political scientists feel that fraud is less likely in larger jurisdictions – the sheer size of the margins makes it harder to successfully commit fraud. However, that still leaves the possibility in an NPV system of greater confusion about a close election’s outcome as allegations and real incidents occur in multiple states.

I gave careful consideration to voting for the NPV just to keep the conversation alive about reform of the electoral college, but all-in-all I really feel that — lacking a runoff mechanism — the NPV proposal is not sound enough to make a positive statement for change.

Nor, honestly, am I clear in my mind that the electoral college – which embodies our national history as a union of states – is the root of political evil. Certainly the concept of sending electors to a college is anachronistic, but the formula for the college embodies a balance of power between large and small states.

I am less interested in changing the mechanics and more interested in developing and supporting national candidates who combine truthful vision with the skills to engage to a broad range of people across the nation.

As always, I appreciate feedback. My e-mail is willbrownsberger@gmail.com and my cell phone is 617-771-8274. My website is www.willbrownsberger.com.

Will Brownsberger
State Representative, (617) 771-8274 (cell)
Visit www.willbrownsberger.com for news.